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,., _ ,TAHT , RELATIONS OF PHIIJOSOPHY AND RELIGION 
''There has been, of recent years, a good dea.l of dis-
cussion about the relation of religion to philosophy, so that I 
need not offer any apology for ta.king up the subject here.''l. 
This is Radhakrishnan ' s remark in the introduction of his article, 
"Religion and Philosophy~ Eowever, such current popularity of the 
subject is not the motive of the present paper; nor is it the 
desire for propaganda which necessarily follows a clear knowledge 
and a strong conviction of something which impels the person who 
hi~ \fi ~>IIS possesses them to declar e~. But the writer, being aware of the 
facts of t h e historical relations of one kind or the other between 
philosophy and religion, and yet not knowing their true relations, 
if there are any, proceeds to make an inquiry into the subject 
matter. Let the conclusions be what they will: 
Before any further step can be taken, i~ eems necessary 
to have preliminary definitions of terms. Much of the confusion 
in our thinking is due to the lack of clear and full understand-
ing of words which are used daily in our conversation . Not only 
in the relationship between nations, classes, and individuals, 
does the difference in temperament and in prejudices of all kinds 
play a great role, but even in our apprehension and usage of dif-
ferent terms and concepts it is a great determining factor. The 
law of association leaves us not entirely free from biased and 
one-sided notions of the contents and the meanings of d~fferent 
terminologies. So to a person who is hostile to religion, the 
word religion carries with it all the failures of some historical 
1. Hib. Jour. 20(1921-1922), p.35. 
I I 
2. 
religion and sometimes even the cruelties committed in its name, 
while on the other hand, to a devout person the same word may 
incite the sense of reveren ce and worship gained from his past 
religious experiences. In the same way to a '' plain man'' :philosophy 
is sometimes a word of confusidn and distress, whi1e to a phil-
osopher it is like a crystal which conveys a ~ world of meaning 
to him. 
Defining religion is by no means a simple and easy task. 
~he difficulty is due to the -complexity of religion which is sup-
posed to have signifi cance for th jc omplicated vvhole of life both 
individual and social. Also the difference in philosophical 
t heories and in personal attitudes gives rise to ' a·. great variety 
of definitions of religion. Leuba, in his book, A Psychological 
Study of Religion, gives and criticizes Wundt 's classification of 
the definitions of religion. According to Wundt there are the 
autonomous theory of religion, which can be represented by Schlei-
ermacher's definition, ~a feeling of absolute de pendence", and 
the metaphysical theory, which identifies religion with speculative 
knowledge of the universe, and the ethical theory, which sees in 
religion the realization of moral postulates. The autonomous 
theory is too indefinite leaving the object 6f feeling entirely 
· undefined. The metaphysical · theory confines religous ideas to 
intellectuc:.l problems. The ethical theory is too narrow for 
ethos and religion are not identical in human consciousness. 
()..; 
Therefore Leuba gives different classification, divided 
"" 
into the intellectualistic, affectivistic arid volitional or 
practical points of views which we will consider nOw. It is 
interesting to note that he omits the behavioristic point of view. 
3. 
His whole interest seems to be descriptive. As a representative 
of the first view, Hegel defines religion as "the knowledge pos-
sessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind." Here 
the stress is laid upon the intellectual aspect of religion. The 
best representati~e of the second view, namely the affectivistic, 
be.,. 
will be Schleiermacher who has a lready,.quoted to illustrate the 
autonomous theory of religion. J. Mc Taggart also says, "It seems 
to me that it may best be described as an emotion res tir.g on a 
certain conviction of a harmony between oursel~es and the universe 
at large." The third view a:s-·Le uba gives is the voluntaristic 
or practi cal. I think the voluntaristic and practical points of 
view~ may wel l be separated for there is a marked difference be-
tween the two. To illustrate the former Kant may be quoted : ''Re-
lition is (considered subjectively) the recognition of all our 
duties as divine commands." To illustrate the latter, James says, 
"In the broadest a nd most general terms possible one might say 
that relie;ious life consists of the belief that there is an unseen 
order and that our supreme goo d Dies in harmoniously adjusting 
ourselves ther ·eto. This belief and this adjustment are the religious 
attitude of the soul."l. 
Besides the elements in relidion already mentioned in 
the preceding class.ifications, namely the intellectual, emotional, 
volitional and practical, Radhakrishnan gives a distinct place 
in religion to tradition or dogma. He says that to the type of 
people who are wanting in immediate experiences of God, the his-
torical revelatio n or the traditional fa~th becomes the pathway 
to reality. Such people start in the mist of faith in the autho-
1. The Varieties of Religious Experience p. 53. 
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ritarian r eligion. But tradition has its value "so long as it 
is stimulating and satisfying; and it is supreme till it is sur-
passed." However, I do not think that tradition has any disti nc-
tive place in the normative definition of religion, which we will 
endeavour to formulate at the close of this discussion . 
Another element in religion, namely t he social, do es 
not seem to be in need of s pecial a t tention, for it is the most 
stressed f a ctor in our present day thinking, not only in the 
field of religion but in all the different fields. However, it 
s hould not be excluded from our consideration. Wright's defini-
tion bears this social character very prominently although it also 
includes the other elements. "Religion is the endeavor to secure 
the conservation of socially recognized values through s pecific 
actions t hat are believed to evoke s ome a gen cy di ffere n t f r om the 
ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, 
and t ha t imply a feeling of dep endence upon this agency."l. There 
is still another very important elemen t, namely the normative 
that is also essen tial in the definition of r eli gion, for it is 
tha t which evokes the feeling of reveren~e and loyalty. 
So in conclusion after t hi s hurried and incomplete r e-
view of some of the outsta nding defi nitions with their peculiar 
stress upon this or that element in religion, we mi ght safely say 
that t he definition of religion needs to include the :nys tic feeling , 
t he e t hical implications, the rational factor, the voluntar istic, 
the social and practical, and the norma tive elements. To serve 
our pre l i minary purpose I suggest the following de~inition, not 
because it is, I t h ink, the best one in any sense, but be ca us e 
1. Students' Philosophy of Reli gion p.47. 
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it is, I hope, not exclusive at least. Religion is the feeling 
and understanding of one's personal relation with God, which ma-
nifests itself inwardly in the communion with God and in the im-
pli cit faith in the ultimate conquest of the e; ood and outwardly, 
in acts of worship and in carrying out the unswerving will to 
strive .for such a conquest as the destiny of Inankind . 
Now, how shall 'we define philosophy? James says, ''A 
philosophy is the expression of a man's intimate character, and 
all definitions of the universe are but the deliberately adopted 
reactions of human characters upon it.''l. This at least partly 
accounts for the variety of the definitions of philosophy, we 
find . Lotze defines it, ''Philosophy is always a piece of life, 
except in rare cases, a proponged philosophical labour is nothing 
else but the attempt to justify scientifically a fundamental view 
of things which has been adopted in early life."2. The modern 
definitions are all more or less in terms of life. Radhakrishnan 
writes tha t "Philosophy is the science of being in general and 
not of matter or of nature •... Philosophy is not divorced from 
life as its problem is provoked by life and as its validity is 
tested by its adequacy to account for life. Philosophy is no 
doubt a theory, but it is not a theory of theory, but a theo_ry of 
life, and therefore it is at home in life, a[ld not in a far off 
region of false abstractions.''3. Hibben emphasizes the same point 
when he says, "The problem s .. of philosophy are, in fact, the pro-
blems of life, the burden and the mystery of existence, the ori-
l.A Pluralistic Universe p .47. 
~. The )~. ei gn of Relig ion I n Contem::g_orary Philpsonhy p .20. 
~ . - C ontempo rary Rev ~ J an .. · 1880~ p~ l3'7~ . -. 
I .-- ~· ..... • ; ~ 
6. 
gin a:hd destiny of man, the relations which he sustains to the 
vwrl Ei of which he is a part, and to the unseen universe which lies 
round about him. 11 1. We can also note the relation of the object 
of philosoph.Y to the results of sciences from Patrick's statement. 
"The object of philosophy is to take over the results of the var-
ious sciences. to add to them the results of the religious and 
ethical experiences of mankind, and them to reflect upon the whole. 
The hope is that, by this means, we may be able to reach some 
general conclusions as to the nature of the universe and as to 
our r osition and prospects in it. 
11 The human mind is not content merely to determine the 
invariable sequences of pheno;nena and to formulate their manner 
of behavior. It craves soine ultimate explanation of things - their 
first cause, their moving cause, their purpose, their meaning, 
their value. 11 2. This statement implies the theoretical end of 
philosophy, namely some ultimate explana tion that the hu:nan mind 
craves for. But whether philosophy attains this~nd orrot is an-
other question where opinions differ very widely. To Russell 
·philosophy has the value of at least raising a nd informing us t hat 
there are such questions to be conte1nplated. He says, 11 Fhilosophy 
is to be studied, not for the sake of many definite answers to its 
questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to 
be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; be-
cause these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, 
enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic as-
surance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all 
1. G.T.H.Patrick Introduction to Phil. p.9. 
2. ,, " p.l5. 
?. 
because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy 
conte:nplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes ca-
pable of that union with the universe which constitutes its 
highest good."l. To such a skeptical mind, such a skeptical at-
titude will be at home. But while there is a great deal of truth 
in that statement, a mind that craves for a more positive assur-
ance viil l naturally continue to seek for that which will satisfy 
' ' 
it. And in virtue of this fact philosophy persists as the quest 
afte r he ultimate reality. So it seems justifiable to conclude 
1be 
fromAf oregoing discussion that philosophy has to do, on the one 
han d, with the ultimate reality and wi th our life , on the other. 
To have a common understanding of the term through out this paper 
at least I define philosophy as follow.s. . Ph ilosophy, as a 
study, is the at tempt to understand and organize t he whole of life 
in harmony with the universe as it conceives;~ and as a ·spirit, it 
is a tireless, endless and unprejudiced, open- minded effort to 
. 
discover and uphold the truth. 
I. Some Instanc es of their Historical Relations. 
Throughout the history of mankind there has been a 
r el ation of some kind between philosophy and reli gion. They do not 
seem to remain entirely independent of each other. The speculative 
tendency at times encroached upon the territory of reli gion and 
vice versa. This at least seems to ·me to be indicative of the 
fact that ih ere is close a:;' 'fini ty between tb.e two. We shall 
examine a few instances of their historical relations. 
l. Russell, B. Proble:t:s of Fhilosophy p .250. 
8. 
A. Conflict. 
In India the most primitive and simples.t form of Vedic 
religion was succeeded by Br ahaminism. The singing of simple 
hymns of praise and prayer to the gods which were personifica-
tions of natural phenomena has taken the form of a priestly system 
in Brahmanism. This was also the beginning of the caste system 
in India. The Vedic nature-worship has changed to a more inward 
and subj ective religious attitude which looks forward to a com-
plete union with Brah:na, essentially pantheistic in its conceution. 
' ~ 
So here , although one is the development of the other, we see 
the conflict between the simplicity and complexity, between the 
subjective and the objective phases of religion. Then Buddha, 
11 the enlightened one" came along and 1nade a vigorous attack UlJOn 
Brahmanism. Buddhism in its origin was almost wholly anti-spe-
culative and ethical. Its religious character was taken on ,~ by 
his disciples after his death. Buddha rejected the old way of 
salvation. He needed neither gods nor men for his salvation. It 
was the achievement of the individual fo r hLns elf and by himself. 
Attaining the tranquillity of man by becoming a part of Brahm as 
Brahmanism offered had no appeal for Buddha. 
We see another case of conflict in the condemnation of 
Socrates in Greece. The two charges brought against him we re, 
first, that he did not believe in the gods received by the State, 
and second, that he corrupted the Athenian youth by teaching them 
not to believe. A quotation from Plato's "Apology of Socrates " 
will reveal clearly that what Socrates was condemned for was his 
speculative tendency and nature study. "Socrates acts vrickedly, 
9. 
and is criminally curious in searching into things under the 
earth, and in the heavens, and in making the worse appear the 
better cause, and in teaching these same things to others ... Sacra-
tes was neither hostile nor indifferent to the traditional reli-
gi ous beliefs. Yet in Dewey's words, "the fact that he approached 
the matter (referring to the reconciliation of the traditional 
religious beliefs and the matter of fact knowledge) from the 
side of ma tter of fact method, giving its canons and criteri a 
primacy, was enough to bring him to ih e conde:nna tion of death as 
a contemn er of the gods and a corrup ter of youth."l. 
Theology which is a systematic study of religion has 
been also i n conflict with philosophy and science. We see the 
-tf,e . 
instances i n,\ case of Bruno, Galilee a11d Darwin. These men have 
-suffered for the freedom of speculative and strentific spirit 
the hostility and persecution of the church. By the I nquisition 
of the Roman Catholic Church Bruno was accused of heresy and 
burnt at the stake in 1600. Galilee , the astronomer ~as also 
brought before the Inqui sition in 1615. The Inquisition insisted 
that the proper method of a 1 riving at the truth in astr-onomy is 
by theological reasoning on texts of Scripture. The unanimous 
decision of the Inquisition was as follows: 
"The first proposition, that the sun is the cen ter and 
does not revolve about the earth, is fooli sh, absurd, fals e in 
theology, heretical, because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture; 
the second proposition, that the earth is not the center but re-
valves a bou.t the sun, is absurd, fa.lse in r·hilosophy and, from 
l.Dewey, J . Reconstruction in Phil. p.l4. 
v 
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a theolo gical point of view at least, opposed to the true 
faith."l. The court insisted thatlt he sun revolves about the earth 
because it is said in Psalms, "which cometh forth as a bri de-
groom out of his chamber. " And the sun stood still v·,hen Jo shua 
commanded it. The earth stands still because it is said in Ec-
clesiastes, "The earth standeth fast forever." Sale of Galilee's 
works v;as forbidden and with threats of torture and dungeon he 
was forced to denounce his theory and his friends. 
Darwin's Origin of Species and Descent of Man raised 
an other battle. Ridicule a:;d condemnation of various forms 
were the rewards· of his vwrk. "Wilberforce, Bishop of Oxford, 
declared that Darwin was guilty of 'a tendency to limit God's 
glory in creation '; that ' the principle of natural selection is 
absolutely incompatible with the word of God'; that it 'contra-
diets the revealed relations of creation to its Creator'; that 
it is ' a dishonouring view of nature ' ; and that there is ' a sim-
ple explanation of the presence of these strange forms muong 
the works of God ' ; that explanation being ' the fall of Adam.'"2. 
From England, America, Australia, France and Germany, from the 
Protestant institutions, leaders and writers as well as from the 
Catholic ones the at t ack on Darwin was violent and fierce. But 
as the force of sci ence constantly increased, the change of the 
day came c.:m d the church 1 eaders were forced to recognize that 
they were encroaching upon the field of science. When the death 
of Darwin occurred they saw the appropriateness of burying 
1. Whi t e, A.D. Warfare Bet. Science and Theol.Vol.l.p.l3?. 
2 . II II " II II p .?Q. 
,. 
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him in · ~ Westminister Abbey. But some belated thinkers still 
believe that the burial of Darwin in Westminister Abbey is a 
l' roof that England is not a Christian country. 
We can easily say today tba. tthe church has no business 
to interfere with the pur suit of knowledge andtruth which is the 
object of philosophy and science. Furthermore, we can say tha t 
the Bible is not to teach science but t & serve a : religious 
purpose, therefore no discovery should be condemned because it 
contrE.tdicts a verbal statement of the Bible. Still further, we 
someti~es laugh at the absurdity of the church leaders just 
di scuss ed in the above paragraph, forgetting that the better 
light we have now than what they had then is only our inheri-
tance . 
B. Neutrali ty. 
' 
There ~~have been so1ne cases where the philosophers 
tried to separa t .e:··" the field of philosophy and the field of re-
ligion so as to establish a neutral relationship between the two. 
However these cases do not seem to be as r:ronounced as the cases 
of con~lict . We will consider the positions of a few men . 
The theory of double truth as given by B. Averroes, 
· an Arabian thinker i s the scholastic period, is an instance. He 
held that ''the common men ca{mot grasp the whole truth, that in 
religion it is given to him in symbols which the philosopher 
interprets allegorically , but which the common man takes liter-
ally. Henc e a thing may be true in philosophy that is not true 
in theol ogy , and vice versa."l . He is not separating here the 
l. Thilly, F. Hist. of Phil. p.l87. 
I 
I 
12. 
truth into parts, one of which belongs to philosophy ~nd the 
other to religion. But he is rather explaining the two diffe~ent 
vi ew.: points o~ approaches of representatiom of the truth and 
their effec t s upon common people. This explanation does not 
. seem to be profound enough to make an impression even though 
there is some element of truth in it. 
Duns Scotus, on the other hand, clearly separates 
the domain of each field. He believed that the conflict be-
tween the truths of faith and the truths of reason is not neces-
sary. "He did not consider propositions pertaining to divine 
nature, divine purpose, divine presence and predestination, the 
immortality of the soul, and the like, susceptible of rational 
demonstration or the arguments fol' them valid. 11 1. These are the 
problems of faith and belong to theology. No science can tell 
us the truth about them. He aloo maintained tha~hilosophy, too, 
has its own princ iples and is independent science. I t is in no 
way subordinate to theology or under obligation to serve theology. 
In h is contention vte find the clear separation of philosophy and 
religion. 
William of Occam is another English philos01.1her who held 
that llphilosophy and theology do not play into each other's hands. 11 2 
He said that experience is the source of our knowledge, and~ll 
knowledge that transcends experience is a matter of faith. "It 
is impossible to demonstrate the existence of God either ontolo-
gically or fro m experience . .• Still, the existence of God is 
possible on rational grounds, whereas the articles of faith cannot 
1. Thilly, F. Hist. of Phil . 
2. " " 
p .208. 
p.216. 
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be _rendered intelligible to reason. It is impossible to ration-
alize Christian dogmas; all we can do is to believe them."l. 
Francis Bacon, another ~nglish empiricist, also made 
a cleavage betv1een theol ogy and philosophy by distnissing the 
dogmas to a separate territory and leaving the field fre e for 
philosophy. He did not believe in\the attempt to deduce the 
truth of the Christian religion from the principles of philoso-
phers. He did hot consider the union of science and faith ale-
gitimate one. He thought that the study of nature and the con-
templation of his creatures give us some knowledge about God, 
but never a perfect one. So we cannot adapt the heavenly mys-
teries to our reason . He sai d , "Quit the small vessel of human 
reason and put ourselves on board the s hip of the church, which 
possesses the divine needle for justly shaping the course. The 
sta.rs of philosophy will be of no further service to us. As we 
are obliged to obey the divine law, though our will murmur against 
it, so we are obliged to believe in the word of God, though our 
reason is shock ed at it •.. After all, it is more worthy to be-
1 i eve t han to know as we now know. •• 2. 
Very similar to Bacon ' s ideas were Locke ' s except that 
in Locke ' s statements we do not find such strong emphasis on the 
traditional revel a tian as in Bacon. In Locke 1 s essay, "Faith 
and Reason," he separates the distinc t~provinces of faith and reason. 
He says tha,t the things above reason are, when revealed, the pro-
per matter of faith. "'l'here being 1Uany things, of whose past, 
present or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, 
l.Thilly, F. Hist. of Phil. p.216. 
2 . Quotatid>n from Bacon used in F. Thilly' s His t.of Phil. p .263 . 
14. 
we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the dis-
covery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are when re-
vealed, the proper matter of faith."l. Furthermore, according 
. . 
to his theory, the things that are not contrary to reason, if 
revealed, are matter of faith and must carry through ae;ainst 
probable conjectures of reason. And yet when reason can afford 
certain knowledg e it is to be taken into account. "Whatsoever 
is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our prejudices, opin-
ions, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full 
as-sent. Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes 
not away the land:narks of knowlede;e: this shakes not the founda-
tions of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which 
they were given us. ~ 2. 
C. Harmony. 
Not only have there been in history the instances of 
conflict and neutrality between philosophy and religion , but 
there also have been instances of harmony . This harmonious re-
lationship has been conceived sometimes as consistency and at 
other times as identity between philosophy and religion. Such 
harmony does not lie necessarily between the historical religions 
and philosophy, but rather between some of the essential fac -
tors in reli g i on and in philosophy. We will nowc.onsider the point 
. t• . ~ 1n ques 1on 1n~case . of the five great philosophers in h istory, 
narnely, Plato , Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Lotze. 
Plato's " I dea of the Supreme Godd~ , seems to me, is 
nothing but another n~~e for God. The ethical and teleological 
l.Fraser,A. C.An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by Lock e 
Vol. 2. p .-4 23 . 
II It p .426, 2. Fras er, A.C. ,, 
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conception of his whole system is essentially consistent with 
religion. So much so that Moore says, uThe ethical theism of 
Plato see:ned to be the philosophical counterpart of tre Jewish 
religious doctrine~; and his conception of the way of salvation 
as conformation to the character of God, and of the goal as an 
eternal existence of the :pure sou1 with God, was the sublimation 
of the doctrine of the mysteries ."l. 
Immanuel Kant also conceived the consistency between 
religion and philosophy. He, being impressed by the discrepancy 
between the realm of nature with its strict causal connections 
and the moral realm with its "categorical imperative", postulated 
a God who is transcending the natural order and yet has the power 
to bring that order into harmony with the moral wo rld. He contend-
ed that the world of science has no place for such conceptions as 
the ultimate character of the world, the exis tence of Goa, the 
freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. Therefore 
the intellectual demonstrations of those conceptions are impossi-
ble. But the world of science is not the whole world, And the 
:noral world· when subjected to rational criticism implies the free-
dom of the vdll, the Lnrnortali ty of the soul, and the existence 
of God. 11 Thus what on merely intellectual grounds remains uncer-
tain though possible must on moral grounds be assu~ed to be true. 
Thus Kant has, as he said, ' destroyed(intellectually certain) 
knowledge to make r111om for faith' (baseEi on moral experience and 
logical reasoning. )"2. Singer writes too that "the religion o~ 
I~nanuel Kant can be put in one phrase, 'We cannot know that there 
1. Moore, G.F. The Birth and Growth of Rel.p.l78. 
2. Vlright, W.K. A Student's ~~).il. of Rel. p .l87. 
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is a God; but we ought to live as though there were one. '" 1. 
So in Kant's philosophy anso we see not merely the absence of 
conflict between philosophy and religion but an inner harmony 
between the two, not so much of a theoretical one as it is of a 
practical. 
Hee; el identifies religion and phi lo sophy . He writes, 
"The object of rldgj_on as well as of philosophy lii s eternal truth 
in its objectivity, God and nothing but God, and the explication 
of God .... Thus religion and philosophy come to be one. Phil-
osophy is itself, in fact, worship, it is r eligion , for in the 
same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to 
occupy itself with God ... "Philos ophy is thus identical with 
religion, but the distinction is tha t it is so in a pecul iar man-
ner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is com-
manly called religion as such. What they have i n common is, that 
they are religion; what distinguishes them fro jn each other ·is 
merely the kind and manner of religion we find in each. It/is just 
h ere, however, that the difficulties l ie which appear so great, 
that it is even regarded as an i mpossibHi ty that philosophy should 
be one with religion. 11 2. 
We see another case of consistency in Schleiermacher's 
ex-olanation of the harmonious relationship between the two. His 
~ . 
' interest was mainly Jn theol ogy and his influence was counted 
e as rnos t jimportan t in Pro tes tan t t heology. Leuba says of him, "For 
him religion consists in certain feelings holding a definite 
relation to the life of action (moral ity) and to the life of 
1. Singer, E.A. Mo dern Thibkers and Present Problems p.l29. 
2. Hegel , G.F.Vl. Philosophy of .Rel.Vol.l . pp.lS-21. 
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of . thought (science, philoso phy). He makes legi tirnately a s harp 
disti n ction between the feelings and ideas which arise ~hen the 
feelings are made the objects of reflection: 'If you aall these 
ideas' says he, ' religious p rinciples and ideas, you are not in 
error. But do not forget that : t his is scientific treatment of 
religion, knowledge about it, and not religion itself.'"l. 
Sc~leiermacher includes in religion one ' s feeling of ri gh t relation 
to morality and to thought life in general, part of vhich is 
philosophy . Not only in this sense but also in his ad~ptation 
of German idealism to the requirements of religion he finds 
harmonious relationship between philosophy and religion. He 
maintai ned that ''God is absolute and eternal, but i rnmanent in the 
v·orld; man in his finitude and morality ia dependent on Him. Man 
in all religions seeks and partially succeeds in finding Union 
w i th G 0 d. II 2 . 
The introductory words of Lotze's Metaphysic gives 
t h e clue to his conception of the consistency and the harmonious 
re£ationship of philosophy and religion. 11 The ttue beginning 
of metaphys ic s lies in ethics, I a~~it, that the expression is 
not exact; but I still feel certain of being on the ri ~h t track, 
when I seek in thatVihich should be the ground of that which is. 11 
His system was combination of "the monadology of Leibniz with the 
pantheism of Sp inoza, which sought to reconcile monism and plural-
ism, mechan ism and teleology, realism and idealilsm, l)antheism 
and theism and which he called teleological idealism. His aim was 
1. Leuba,J.H. A Psychological S tudy of Rel. p.347 . 
2. Wright, W.K. A Student's Phil.p.l94. 
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to do justice to the claims of an ethical-religious idealism 
(Fichte ) as well as to the so ber scientific interpretation of 
natural phenomena."l . V/ith such a conscious airn, he says that 
"it is an intolerable thought to suppose that a cold material 
atomic mechanism should exist for the sole purpose of picturing, 
in the feeling soul, a beautiful illusion of colors and sounds. 
Such a universe would have neither meaning nor ethical worth. 
We can interpret reality only as something which we can absolutely 
approve, as something absolutely g ood; hence the phenomenal 
world cannot be a meaningless illusion, but rn~st be conceived as 
the mani festation of an ethically ordered spiritual world ... We 
cannot think of anything existing that ought not to exist; our 
forms of thin_'l{ing ( the logical laws ) are rooted in the demand 
for the good, and reality itself is rooted in what is absolutely 
g ood, in the hie;hest good ..• The human soul ,· is compelled to 
interpret the universal substance in terms of the hi ghest reality 
that it knows, -as a personality; and we must think this divine 
pers onality as an absolutely g ood being, as a God of love."2. 
We see clearly that his ethical conception of the reality is not 
only in harmony with reli gion but it is essentially religious itsel~ 
So far to serve our present purpose we have discussed 
the different relations of philosophy and religion just as they 
existed in history, namely, conflict, neutrality, and harmony, 
without passing any reflective considerations or criticisms upon 
them. These specific cases may not appear again, but their main 
contentions may be brought up again later in the paper . 
1. Thilly,F. Hi st . of Phil.p .495. 
2 . ,, ,, .. p.497-498. 
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:EI. . Their Relat ions in Subject mat t er and Methods. 
Phi lo sophy and rel i g ion seem to have a c ommon suoject 
matter to a great ex ten t. Altho ugh they have different.methods 
of approach to this common s ubj ec t matte r the demarcation can 
not be clearl y l ocated. So we will proceed in examinine, .. t he i r 
relations in s ubject matter and methods . 
A. Subject matter . 
The fundamental problem which both philosophy and re-
li gion deal with i s the Ul timate Reality . They are also con-
cerned with the probl ems of va l ue an d the interpretc..t i on of li f e . 
"Thus me t aphys ic s and re li gion are alike in tha t t hey both s e ek 
to satisf y the hvman demand for a compreh ens ive a nd consistent 
world vi ew , fo r a. doctri ne of t he true meaning and value of human 
life i n its relation to the wo rl d-whole ."l. 
1. Search After Ulti mate Re ality . 
What gives rise to such a search i s a very interesti ng 
ques tion to ask. The apparent change constantl y going on in the 
phenomenal world s eems to be one of the r easons why reople look 
for something permanen t and really real as soon as they e,et over 
that primitive stage v.-hen the faculty of reflectio n i.s in quies-
cence . This sta te of ceaseless change and constant flux has 
a ttracted t he a ttention of one of the earliest Greek phi losophers, 
Heracl itus . His fundamental s ayi ng is "y ou could not s t ep t wice 
into t he same rive r, for other and yet other via ters are ev er 
flov:i ng on. '1 Th is co nstant change which environs pe ople twenty 
1. Lei ghto n , J. A. Man and the Co smos . p .537. 
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four hours a : day becomes a stimulant to especially the thinking 
man. 
And his curiosity is aroused. His mi nd starts out 
for its endless :j ourney in search for the Permanent and the Ul ti-
mate. What is it all about'? i s his question toward. the world. 
His intellectual unrest makes him observe and accumulate all kinds 
of data that will help him determine the existence and the nature 
of this reality . I do not mean to say that a l l those vihose cur-
iosity is aroused would go as far a.s this. Most of tJ:~em fall by 
the wayside often unsatisfied but s ometimes satisfied, figuratively 
speaking, ~ith some f l owers, some books, some jew~l s or something 
· they picked up on their way. Only comparatively few would go as 
far as they can, as the history of philosophy shows . And now 
after all these years of human history, the question , Do we know 
all about the Ultimat~ Rea l ity? is stil l answered in the negative . 
To the majority of people, it i s not so much their in-
telle c tual curi osity as their empirical need for a firm foothold 
that sets them on their j ourney. I n David Hu'lle ' s words, "In all 
nations th£ . first ideas of religi on arose not fr om a contem-
plati~B of the works of nature, but from a con cern with regard to 
the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which 
ac lt uate the human rnind ."l. The wor l d with all its inexpl icable 
phenomena and the hwnan l if ~ with all its incomprehensible eccen-
tricities cause such an uncertai n state of r!lind . The complexity 
of human life with al l its dualistic tendencies and multiple con-
tradictions present a problem far f rom being easy to handle . · The 
1. Hume , D. Es says Vol.2 . 1889 . 
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SlJiri tual impotence of man and the insufficiency of an alleged 
remedy on the one hand and the progressive, autonomous character 
of the spiritual life on the other, force upon hthl to seek for a 
way that will emami:ipa te him from the small s.elf and the me rely 
.human order. A man caught in a net of contradictions hune; over 
the sea of uncertainty is surely in need. ''\r'Jha t is it all about 
any way? Life - all of it. What ' s the use of it?" This is the 
common expression echoing round the world. 
So the ques t ~pitiated and supported by the human 
environment of change and uncertainty, the phi losophic curiosity 
of the thinking mind, and the empirical ne ed of the common peo-
ple for a firm foothold, continues as long as the life itself 
is in existnece. What then, are some of the conclus ions that 
have been reached; if there are any, as to the conception of this 
Ul timate Reality, which ev ery one is se e~ing for consciously or 
unconsciously? 
Materialism is one form of the answer t hat many phil-
osophers held, beginning from Leucippus and Democritus. I t is 
"that metar-hysical theory which regards all the facts of the 
universe as sufficiently explained by the assunption of body or 
matter, conceived as extended, i mpenetrable, eternally existent, 
and susceptible of movement or change of relative position. 
Mat t er in motion is held to be the fundamental constituent or ul-
tima te fact of the universe; and all phenomena, including the 
phenomena of i!ronsciousness, are reduced by the theory to transform-
ations of material moleucles. "l. This theory is ~hay.aetew:-iz.e~ 
Baldwin, J.M. Dictionary of Phil. & Psy . Vol.2.p.4 5 . 
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by its reduction of all qualitative differences to quantitative , 
. namely, to differences in size, form, arrangement, and situa,tion 
of the individual atoms. It is alHD characterized by its denial 
of the intelligent purpose or final cause. It explains the whole 
process of the o'rganization of the world from its beginning by 
mechanism . Teleology is an unwelcom e · stranger at the door of 
materialism. However, it fails to give any account of the origin 
of ~ motion. 
Over against materialism there is another theory called 
idealism which "maintains the universe throughout the work or the 
embodiment of reason or mind. "l. This theory is teleological 
through and through. Not only the resv~ t, but also the rroce-a s 
of the cos1ni'c evolution is determined by reason or mind. The 
ultimate explanation of the world is in the realization of rea-
son, self- consciousness, or spirit. The identity of the real and 
the rational is the main the~is ~ of Hegel's absolute idealism. 
There is still another theory call ed dualism. It is 
trie theory which "explains the facts of the universe by referring 
them to the action ~ two independent and eternally coexistent 
principles. "2. Both matter and spirit are eternal, independent 
and necessary principles. Plato, who was the first one to realize 
the conception of spirit as consistently immaterial, regarded the 
ideas alone .:b.S truly existent. But when he found it impossible 
to exp<Hd n the world of phenomena in terms of pure ideas, he re-
lar:-sed into dualism, thus giving the second princiy1le of non-
being or necessity- the Platonic matter, as the ground work of the 
1 . Baldwin, J.M. Dictionary of Phil. & Psy.Vol.l.p.500. 
2. " " " " p .298. 
23. 
sensuous existence. Beginning from Aristotle, his immediate 
follower and disciple, reaction began against such a dualistic 
explanation of the facts of the universe and continued in modern 
fi!Trms of monism. 
In neo-realism, th~reality is neither mind nor mat ter, 
but· it is the " neutrc=~l stuff'' that is even more prirni ti ve than 
either. This neutral stuff becomes a mental entity or a material 
entity according as t h e cause is mental or physical. So this t!1e-
ory holds that the ultimate r·eality is the 11 neutral - stuff.•' 
Personalism is another theory which tries to explain 
Reality as a divine person or God. This theory attempts to meet 
and harmonize unity and plurality, necessity and freedom. It 
corlCeives the universe as a continuous creation of the divine 
person who uses mechanism as one of His methods in the proces s of 
creation and yet still having a divine purpose toward ~hich the 
whole creation moves. So the Ultimate Reality according to per-
sonalism is God. 
The above discussion of the different philosophical 
theories as to the ex:plana tion of the ultimate reality is by no 
means complete. But this will have to suffice for our purpose here. 
And we will turn to a short consideration of the attempts of 
religion; in the interpretation or determ ination of the u~timate. 
Long before personalism ca.ne into the field of philosophy as a 
me taphysical theory this notion of a personal God was held, in 
much more crude form than that of the personalistic philosophy, 
by almost all the monotheistic religions. Par ticularly the Je-
hovah of the Hebrew religion and the Father of the Christian reli gion 
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illustrate the lJOint. Jehovah was conceived as the Crea tor of 
the universe who runs and controls the physical world. And the 
New Testament conception of the Father presupposes this idea. 
However , in religion the main purpose is not to enlighten people 
in the metaphysical theories of the explanation of the world . 
So we often find the ili fferent historical reli gions built upon 
the accep tance of current philosophical theories of t~ times 
in regard to these matters. 
Whether the ultimate reality is ma tter or mind or both 
or neutral entities or a personal God, the Ultimate Reality it-
self can only determine. These different explanations all in-
volve difficult problems that the limited human understanding 
cannot apprehend clearly. I nexplicable points and inarticulate 
meanings in them are only trusted to the limited and under:endable 
reason and faith of human beings. ~There stands continually be-
tween us and r eality that ghost of our own particular thought 
and reflection, which threatens to reduce the world to a shadow; 
instead of seeing the things we see only a haze with which they 
are surrounded, and we only substitute one haze for another when 
we believe we have unveiled them. "l . So the q_uest is not yet 
answered a nd the journey is still on. But if the mystery is total-
ly unveiled, what Viould the human mind seek aft er unless its ca-
pacity andjdelight in search are taken away with it? I t is not ne-
cessarily the at tained goal that sati~fies the human mind, but the 
striving itself tha t!lends a constant charm. Shoulawe not r ather 
say then with Browni ng thatthe glory of man lies in his constant 
striving for so ;nething higher? 
1. Sucken, R. The Truth of Rel . p.lOl. 
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" It is not what man does, 
Which exalts him, but what he would do." 1. 
"God is,they are, 
Man partly is, and wholly hopes to be. "2. 
"Oh, but a man ' s r each should exce ed his grasp, 
Or What's a heaven for? 11 3. 
2. Conservation of Values. 
Another common task for phi lo sophy and religion is to 
apprehend and conserve values . Leuba affirms the commonness of 
this task but clearly distinguishes the difference in their ap-
proach . "Re l igion and philosophy have the same task. Both a im 
to apprehend the worlds of values as ultimately identical with 
each other, and therefore the v.rorld-totali ty as absolut el y valu-
able. Both philosophy and religion must transcend the life-exper-
ience for t hat end. But for the supplementation of all possible 
experience religion and philosophy take opposite directions. 
We may say that religion transcends expe rience, but thatbhilo solJhy 
goes back to the presuppositions of experience. Relie;ion cons;.. 
tructs a superstructure which overa rches the experienced world; 
philo sophy builds a structure which s ppports the experien ced world. 
For that reason religion creates G-od, who gives value of holiness 
to the worl d; philosophy seeks the ultimate foundation in the ex-
t ernal act which gives to the world the value of absoluteness."4. 
By va lue is mean t vlhatever the human being desires, 
prefers, or approves. Values may be classified in general as 
1. Brownine;, R. 
2. II II 
II 
Saul 
Death in the Desert 
Andrea DelSarto 
4 . Leu ba, J . H. ::.:.A:._..::P:....:S:::..YLC~h~o=l..:::o .s;;g...:· i:...:c::.:a:::.:l=--=S....:t....:u.;.;:d::..y'---o;:;.:f:;;,.__R...;;.e..;..;.l • p. 23 5 • 
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intrinsic and instrwnental. In, trins ic values are the values 
desired for t heir own sakes while instrtwen tal ones are val ues 
in tbat they are contributory or instrumen t al to the intrinsic 
val ue s. Everett groups all the economic values under the i nstru-
mental. The intrinsic values a re ac cording to his a scending or-
der , bodily , recreational, associational,character, aes thetic, 
i ntel l e ctual and reli gi ous. Whi l e these va lues ai·e a utonomous 
having their own rights an d principles, they ar ~ no ~ore indepen-
dent than the citi zens of a state are . Historically , psychol o-
gically andlo gically they ar e dependent to ea ch other. Yet it is 
their di s tinct character that makes possible the variety in the 
~hole of our experiences. 
Conserva tion in the wide sense of the term. includes 
"q_uant ita tive increase of the object that is of value, in the case 
of fo od , rain, and other materi a l goo ds . I t also includes en-
hancement or intens ification of the value, ei pecially in the case 
of moral spiritual good - such a s harmony, loyalty, purity of heart , 
soci a l soli darity, sense of divine presence and sup1)0r t, and the 
like.•• 
Remembering these points vie will now consider the 
part wh ich rtiilosophy and religion played in evolving and mai n-
taining these values. We may say that ev en without a systemat i zed 
philosophy or r elig ion, as in the primitive society of men, there 
ha s been a certa in kind of moral code or ethical rules recognizing 
and attempting to cons erv e certa in amount of all value s enlisted 
in the pr e ceding paragraph. Undoubt edly, in the most pri mi tive 
stage of mankind the bodily values must have received t he mo st 
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atte ~ tion, due to the undeveloped condition of mind and its con-
sequent lack of the control of the envirorunent for the safety 
and welfare of the body. But as the civilization grew and :nore 
people are thrown together to live in a society, philosophy had a 
distinct par t throuc;h its science of ethics in settin,s up the 
theoretical basis of a value-world. Religion h a d its part in 
feeding the emotions of the people so as to provide the motive 
an~ the drive for the people to live out a moral life in practice . 
This statement does not mean to imply that philosophy always stood 
for the highest type of morality nor relieion always supr;lied the 
dyn_amics for living out such a life of value. Unfortunately, his-
tory tells us too many cases of the oontrary. But in general it 
is fair to say that both philosophy and rel i gi on atte.Gpt to con-
serve the greatest amount of and the highest kind of v a lues. 
Wright enumerates the values conserved by Australian 
r e ligion as follov~ s : first, social solida rity through partic i pa-
tion in solemn rites, festal dances, discussion of their history 
and traditions; second , " making this evolution possible ~ t h ird, 
vague awareness of a spiritual powe r in the universe that is 
more than hmnan. "l. As it is already mentioned, the different 
values cannot be isolated apart from the rest . So it wi ll not 
be corrd ct to say that reli g ion has helped to evolve and maintain 
only the religious values. Among the historical religions, Christi-
anity in par ticular, has such a wide influence in the value world. 
"I t stood emphatically for the purification of home life, and of 
relations between the sexes •.. It has be en zealous in all forms of 
l. Wright,W.K. A St udent ' s Phil. of Rel.p .l6-17 . 
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humanitarianism ..• It has usually stood for social justice''l. 
And nany others besides these can be mentioned, but if we are to 
find a unique and distinctive value fostered and maintained by 
religion, it is al~ available. I t !i s the religious val ue , that 
colors the whole of life. And this value is attained through the 
unique experience of communing with God . This experience involves 
the unique attitude of life, faith in the capac ity to a chieve the 
ri ghteous ness of the world , and will to cooperate with God in 
confidence and trust. 
I n the same way, if we are to find a unique value that 
has been maintained by philosophy it would be the intellectual 
values . The speculative and inquiring tendency of :philosophy 
devoted to the search for truth cannot help but be an agency through 
which the intellectual values are conserved. Philosophy . in its 
beginnine; was an exclusive study of nature a nd,therfor e, can le-
gitimately be called the initiator of the modern sciences. So it 
is the discoverer, producer and conserver of the intellectual 
values , although it cannot be restr icted to this field only. We 
may say that it has an intellectual approaqh to all other values 
in their interpretation as ·wel l as in their evaluation. 
Sorley writes, "Acco r ding to his view (H "ffding ) the 
permanen t and essential element in religion is a faith in the 
conservation of value. The axiom of the conservation of value, 
in his theory, is to religion what the axiom of the conservation 
of energy is to physical science •. . What is meant by asserting 
it is that the r el igious consciousness is vitalized by this as-
1. Wright, W. K. A Student's · Phil. of Rel. pp. 200-201 . 
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sumpti on, just a s physical science car-ries on its work upon the 
assum:rtion t ha t the quantity of energy in an isolated physical 
system re:nains· a constant"l. So the faith in the conservation of 
~al ues s up: ly the foundation upon which the structure of the 
reli g ion is built. Indeed, this is the foundation for all nor-
mat iv e sciences. Cons ervation of values cannot be elimina ted from 
the subject matter of both philosophy and reli gion . 
3. Interpretation of Life. 
Philosophy and reli gion do not limi t their field to 
the inquiry of the ultimate reality and the conservat ion of what 
seems to be of value. But t hey also try to gi~e the interpreta-
tion of life as a whol e . The word . life is here used in a very 
general sense. "Li fe is a new kind of reality, not in the vi-
t a listic sense of a kind of a new factor intruding into physical 
bodies, but in the evolutionary sense of a new reality emerging 
fr om t h e organi zation of s i mpl e r el~nents into more complex and 
mo re h i ghly integrated forms of be i ng '' 2. Life is an evolutionary 
process constantly being created. As to the source of life, the 
creativ e agency , different names were appro pri a t ed throughout 
the history. I t is the World Buil der accordi ng to Pl ato ; Aris -
totle ' s ·First :M CY er ; Anax agoras ' Nous or , ind; Bruno and Spinoza ' s 
Natura Naturans ; He&el ' s Absolute Idea ; Fichte 's Abs ol ute Ego; 
Schel i ng ' s Pure Crea tive Energy; Schopenhaue r ' s Absolute Will; 
Niet~ghe ' s Will to :!?ower; von Ha:ttmaq 's Unconscious Will; Fe chner ' s 
' lo rl d Soul ; Wundt ' s Universal Wi ll; Spencer's Unknowable ; Arnold ' s 
Po~er that Mak~s for Riehteousness; ~odern l dealists ' Absol ute 
Self a nd other philosophie s and r el i gi ons ' God. Tnis multipli-
l.Sorley,W. R. Moral Values andthe I dea of God pp . 158_159 . 2 . Patric.K, J.T. V! . In tra. to Ph il. ,.., a.-:: 
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city of- names indicate a t leas t t hat they a ll con ceived t he source 
a s One and not many . 
The most fundamental que stion universally asked i n re-
gard to life i s whe t her it is good or bad. "A fri end propos ed to 
the l a te F. W.H. Mye r s the followi ng question: ' What i s the thing 
which abov e all other y ou would like to know? If yo u could ask 
the s :t:hinx one question, and only one, wha t v1ould the question 
be '?' After a mo:1lent ' s s il ence Myers repli ed : 'I thi n .. l c it woul d 
be this : I s the Univ . er se fri endl y '?"'!. I n other words, the ques -
t ion is, I s the control of the world in such a dependable Hand 
that the lif e is worth-living for i n s pite of the apparent fu t i-
lities that we obse rve da ily'? I n short, I s life goo d or bad '? Th is 
question has been answered i n many different ways as all questions 
usually a re. But the answers.may be reduced to t h r ee , namely in 
philosophical terms, ressimi sm , optL.ai·sm and meliorism. 
Pess i mism is the negative answer that some philo sophers 
made to the question. They, the pess i mi s ts a gree " that there i s 
more pa i n than pleasure , more di sease than health, mo re defor-
mi ty than normal ity , i n human life and in t he order of nature 
t al< en as a whol e . Therefo re, on the \';hole , the v>orl d order i s 
bad : or at best, it is not mearl y so good as , they can conce ive , 
i t mi gh t have been 11 2 . Schopenhauer sai d, "All livinE i s str·iving , 
all strivi ng i s sufferine;, t he refor e all livi ng i s suffering . 11 
Not only i n philoso phy such a vi ew ha s been held , but a lso in 
Buddhi sm t he negation of the l if e here and now has been promi nent . 
The extinc tion of des i re i n Buddhi sm i s onl y an i ndi rect recognition 
of the evil of life. Even on the ordina r y lev el of lif e , some 
1. Vil~,E.C. The Probl em of Rel. p.ll4 fo ot not e . 
2 . Le i ghton, J. A. Man and the Co smos p .518 . 
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people seem to be temperamen tally c ifted to look &·t the dark 
s id e of life all t he time . Such people turn out to be pe s simistic 
in the common sense. 
On the other hand life is affirmed by many philo so -
phers and relieious lead ers . "I t is the soul of the ~orld that 
is g ood, as Plato long a go taught, and goodness is the deepest 
reality in the universe . This was the united thoueht of Greek 
phi lo s o:t:hY Hebrew wisdom. It has been the sublime faith of all 
the hi e:her religions through out the agee . 11 1. The O}Jtimis ts say 
"That somehow eood 
Will be the final e oal of ill. 
Tha t e ood shall fall 
At last - far off- at last, to all, 
And every winter changes to spring ." 2 . 
I n opposition to Schopenhauer's statement quoted in the preceding 
~aragraph, Leighton says, 11 It is not true that al l life is illu-
s ory striving . I n the present personal relationship, and in the 
contempl ation of nature, of beauty, and of truth , we do not 
str ive . Still les s is it true that all strivir1g is suffering. 
There is sati sfaction in successful activity , there is sati s-
faction in e;oalless activity, there is enjoyment in the con ternJ)la-
tion of' progress, i n the realization of purpose, in the format io n 
of nev1 purr;oses as well as in pres en t atta inment •.. Thus desire 
and want, :pain and craving, are not necessarily evil. They are 
the condi ~i ons of the emergence and emerginc of intelligint pur-
pose. They keep body and mind in action; experience is enl arged , 
1. Wilm, E . C. The Problem of Religion p.l 56. 
2. Tennyson, A. I n Memoriam v.53. 
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kmrwledge is orgaDized, purposes are matured, and lJersonali ty becorn e 
actual. '11. Late r on in his book IJ eighton says that evil in the 
parts is necessary to the goodness of the whole . He presupposes 
the freedom of wi ll on man ' s part as the source of evil. But he 
al s o tak es evil as a part of the ~orld plan. However, he ac-
knowledged that in terms of the rational insight alone, it is im-
pos s ible to harmonize the distribution of evil in the world with 
the idea that the whole ie/-t;erfect or.· t hat there is no hindrance 
to the will of an omnipotent and benevolent being . But he says 
that "the doctrine of a suffering and self-saccrificing God, of 
one who is eternally made perfect through his sympathy and fel-
lowship with erring and sinning humanity, is so far fr om being 
out of harmony viith an ethi cal concertion of the universe, that 
I should ratner maintain that it is the only· doctrine of God tlalat 
at once squares with the facts of experience and does no violence 
to the ethical consciousness of inan . 11 2. So Optimism is t he view 
that "al l things work together for good. " 
Ther is another point still to be noted before passing 
on to the next . That is, any religi on or philosophy with a.n op-
timistic outlo ok for life, do not mean to guarantee one's pri-
vate and personal gratification of desires. "Wi ll religion guan-
an tee rne my private and. lJersonal ha1Jpiness ? 'l'o this on the whole 
I think we must answer no; and if we approach it Vii th a view to 
s uch happine~s then most certainly and absolutely no •.• We 
mi ght ask, for instance, 'Does it make my life more worth-living? ' 
l. Lei ghton, J.A. Man and the Co smos pp .520-52l . 
2. " " " p.534. 
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And the -answer to this might be, ' It is the only thing that 
makes life worth-living at all .'"l . It isnot the good and pl easure 
in- the hedon is tic sense that optimism affirms, but the good of 
the value-world, as the quotation suggest. 
As a "go-between" or "the happy medium" between the 
t vro views, pess imism and optimism, there is still ru other answer 
to the fundamental question, "Is life good? It is meliorism in 
philosophy . It is said to have been invented by George Eliot 
to express a theory mediating between optimism and pessinlism. 
It is the "view of the world which believes that at present the 
sum of good exceeds the sum of evil andthat, in the future, good 
will continually gain upon evil. 11 2. This view does not say that 
world as a totality is good or evil, but it says that there is 
more good than evil. Hence thefworld is ca}:Jable of improvement. 
And the question that seems to be also asked univer-
sally is in regard to the duration of life, especially the human 
life . Are we mortal or immortal? It has been asked and attempted 
answers have been given by rnany philosophical theories and re-
ligions. Hudson says that there are four possible answers to the 
question, "Are vve immortal ? 11 We are. We are not. We cannot 
knovi. 'lie do not know. · He goes on saying, " The real reason why 
immortality does not practically concern themen of today is that 
he is q_uite convinced that the question cannot be solved. Un-
knowable questions are not questions a sensible man, even if he 
be religious, can build his daily life upon , whatever he may as -
1. Bosanquet,B. What Rel. Is. pp.6-7. 
2. The Encyclopaedia Britanica Handy Vol. Issue. V.l8.,p.95. 
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pire to on Sunday. "1. But in spite of the apparent indifference 
on some lJeople ' s part~ this question is till being asked. Plato 
answered such an insoluble question in the affirmative. His rna-
jor argument for immortality ~as the pre-existence of man proved, 
to him at least, by his possession of intuitive faculty or the 
capacity to recognize what he had seem before coming into this 
v;orld. Kant acknowledges it as one of the Lnperative category 
of the moral world, although he says that it cannot be demons-
trated. Buddhism teaches it in the form of transmigration. Chri-
tianity teaches it in the idea of the eternal life as qualitatively 
different from th~perishable life . Still more modern s peculation 
considers the very character of God as the basic argument for the 
belief in immortality. So while there are many objections to the 
belief and many people do no t b, lieve in it, almost all religions 
i nclude or presupposes this f aith. "If God be good, then some-
h ow human persons must be immortal. To promise so much, only 
to destroy us; to raise such hopes, and then to frustrate them; 
to e ndow us with such capacities, that are never to be fully 
used; to instill in us a love for others, al l of whom are to be 
annihilated~ is unworthy of God. Faith in immortality thus rests 
on faith in God. I f there be a God , man ' s irmnortali ty is certain; 
if not, im.:norto.li ty would not be worth having . '' 2. The same idea 
is expressed when the roet sings , 
"Thou wilt not leave us in the dus t : 
Thou madest man, he knows not why , 
He thinks he was not made to die; 
And thou hast made him : thou art just ." 3 . 
l . Hudson, J. W. Truth We Live By p.l20. 
2. Brightman,E.S. I ntra . to Phil. . 
3. Tennyson , A. I n Memoriam The Prologue. 
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B. Methods. 
We are now to consider the r ela tions of philosophy 
and religion in their methods. Reason and faith may be regarded 
a s the chief agencies through whi ch philosophic and religious 
knowledge is attained. It is hard to drav, a dividing line be-
t ween the territories that belong t o one or the other. Conse-
quently, the following discussion of reason and faith as methods 
of philosophy and religion will to a certain extent overlap 
each other. 
Creighton writes, "Reason is, on one side, just the 
transforming power of the mind in action, the striving towards 
a more systematic and significant world of experience, and on 
the other, the power of conserving as elements of that worl d the 
results a lready attained ... The whole mind must criticize itself; 
the self-critical~ind , at home ~ith itself in its own mediwn, 
is just the power to v~hi ch we e;i ve the name of reason. . . I t may 
and mus t love and believe in order to understand, but its spirit 
is that of u.nders tanding and its form that of 1 i gh t '' l. This 
definition seems to include the essential elements that should 
be mentionedfin the explanatio~o6 reason. The.n, reason af?jpower of 
the whole mind includes f~eling an d willing . I t is not an abstract-
tea :faculty which functions in man and yet av.ay from the rest o:f 
his experiences. Neither is reason exhausted by the ways of 
reasoning in science. ''That I am I, the same self this morning 
that went to sl eep l ast night, no scientific laboratory ever provecl 
or would prove. .ihat life is vvorth-while; that an exalted friend-
1. Creighton, J.E . "Reason and ---eeline; " Phi1Rev. Sept .l92lp . 465-481. 
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ship is a noble thing ; that one loves his beloved; that some 
caus es are wor~hy of sacrif ice and death; that the Venus de Milo 
is beautiful, - no one ever goes t o science for the proof of such 
things ... And yet we, including the scientists, act as though 
Y>' e knew t hese things much better than even the formulas of scien-
tific laboratories"l. Regardless of this empirical as J ames puts 
it, "namely, that anything tha t is nece s s a ry i n t he ''HY of belief 
must be susceptible of articulate proof, as rampant as it ever 
was, in the irreligious agnosticism of today; and we fi nd it, 
moreover, bl ossoming out into corrollaries, as, for instanc e , 
t hat to bel i eve anythinc wi.lhltout such proof is to be unscientific, 
and tha t to be unscientific is the loVlest depth to which a think-
i ng :nind can fa l l '12. On the other hand it should be r emembered 
tha t r el i g ion has suffered much alr eady beca use of the oppos ite 
tende ncy which po s s esses the fe eling of arro ga nce in its so call ed 
" blind f a ith. 11 
Then how is reason, a s the power of whole mi nd to un-
ders t and an d sys t ematize the .11ore significant world of experi enc e, 
used in lJhilosophy? Dewey says , "Pure reasoning as a ;nean s of 
a rriving at truth is like the s pi der who s pins a web our of him-
self. fhe web is orderly a nd elaborate , but it is only a trap . 
T~tJ.e r;assive a ccu:nul a tion of experience f3 - the traditional em-
pirical me t hod - is like the ant who busily runs about and col-
l ects a nd piles UlJ heaiJS of raw :na terials . True inethod, tm. t 
·which Bacon would usher in, is co:npa rable to the op erations of t he 
1. Hudson, J. W. Truth We Live By pp . 94-95 . 
2. J ames , 'l. Pr eface v;ri t~en for the I ntro- to Phil . By Pa ul s en 
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bee v,ho, like the ant, collects mate rial from thetext e rnal 
wprl d, but unlike the industrious creature attack s and modifien 
the collected stuff in order to make it yield its hidden trea-
sure 11 1. Her e Dewey seems to consider the pure reas oning as an 
isolated }Jroce ss running oy itself away from the past ex1; eriences 
of oneself . But our above definition of reason given by Creighton 
is mar like the empirical method which Dewey wishes to i n iti ate 
as the me thod of arriving at truth. Philosophy whose goa.l i s truth 
must hire reason if the destination is ever to be reached. Rad-
hakrishnan , a Hindu philosopher, says, "The system of ~ philosophy 
should be the result of thorou€i:h and logical inquiry, founded 
upon a universal examination of reality 11 2. But he regrets that 
the "Independence of thought, which is the brea th and life of 
}Jhi lo sO}Jhy has beco;:ne rar e, and the progress of philo sophy is 
checked11 .3. 
I s reason used also in rel i g ion? Most decidedly so. 
I t is said that"the true living God can be found onl y if we do 
not divorce feeling from reflection. If we cease to thillic i n 
mat ter of relig ion, we shall be l ed into blind alleys 11 4. In 
every religion t her e is an intellectual element, and item of 
knowledge constituting the object of t he belief. "If only as 
students of history we must come to terms with this conspicuous 
fact: that religion has never as yet been able to take itself as 
e a mat t er of fe eling. The intellectual elements of religion must 
'toe vital. .. Humanity mus t give conceptual form to its religous 
1. Dewey, J. ~econstruction in Phil. p .32 . 
2. Radhakrishnan,S. The Rei gn of Rel. in Contemporary ~hi~p.ll. 
3. II II II p . l3. 
4. u 11 11 Rel. and Phil~ Rib. J our.20(1921-1922)p.35. 
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ideals and governing princi ples , because t hese must hold t he i r 
own with all other experience andltheory : but since our only 
re source for framing ideas are s uch as pertaining to this world 
of natural experience, they can never truly r epresent to us any 
obj ect v:hicn is beyond such experience ''l. That is why reli gion 
se ems to have the necessity s ometimes of discounting the in-
tellectual element . From the na ture of man ' s limited knowledge , 
the formulation of reli g ious experiences is not a l ways expres-
sive enough . However, reaso n in its widest and . ~ost coheren t 
sens e does no harm to religion . Furthermore, "the reas on aspect 
of religion is emphasized by the thinkEirs of I ndia as well as 
Germa ny, v:ho s eek in reli g ion for an ultimate solution of the 
doubts, dis putes, and distra ctions '.vhich beset the thinking mi nd 
in this eni g~atical world. I t i s the form of worship which the 
i ntel l ectually-minded offer to the divine reality . .. If reflection 
has inflicted woulds on r eli g ious faith, further reflection will 
heal up the wo unds •.. God is eternal Reason. He imspires the 
deep, religious yearning , andhas granted us t he gift of reason 11 2. 
Now we come to give a specific attention t6 faith. 
Drake g ives a very comprehensive exposit ion of faith both nega-
tively and positively. "Faith , i n its goo d se nse , is not e re-
dulity; it is no t rightly opposed to free inquiry, to the his-
torical : s pirit, or to intellectual conscientiousness. . . I t may 
be used in the sense of trust in a person and ilhat must b e only 
provisional; we cannot ultimately surrender our jude;ement, or 
follow blindly a leader, however dear and worthy of our reverence. 
l. Hocking ,W.E. Meanin ., of God in Human Ex ~e riencepp .60.6l. 
2 . Radhakrishnan ,S. "Rel. and Phil." Hib.Jour.20 l92l-1922) p3 5-;45. 
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. . . I n a slighly different sense, faith ,nay 1nean the adoption of 
a belief as a working hypothe.sis, in lack of sufficient evidence 
to convince the intellect one way or the other, Such a faith is, 
again, often necessary and of great value; but it must remain 
open to challenge and criticism, be freely discarded if evidence 
against it appears, and never asswne a certainty that it dees 
not actually possess." Faith in this sense is used all the time 
in science and in our practical life. But he continues. "In the 
best sense , •. I t is a moral state, a disposition of the heart and 
wil l, which is quite independent of the existence or non-existence 
of any outward facts ... It is the laying hold, through the ima-
gination, on a higher life; the keeping of t he mind set on it 
when lower passions obtrude themselves and mar the visi on; a stead-
fast refusal to 1 et· the concrete failures and -· dis ·couragements ·· of 
the day turn ou:t eys away from that ideal of our life whose pre-
sence is our i:~spiration and power. I t is the' assurance of things 
hoped for ' -that is, and optimistic attitude, a believing attitude 
toward the future; it is ' the conviction of things not seen'; that 
is, a keeping firm hold of the intangible realities of the spirit-
ual life, even when their worth cannot be felt and their glow is 
gone . Faith is then not rightly opposed to reason •.. but to sight; 
it is not a way of ascertaining truth, but a way of holdingon to 
truth that there is ample justification for believing~l. 
As it is already hinted that faith, as a belief in a 
hypothesis is used ih science. "The doctrine t~ t ' ~robality is 
the guide of life' is one on which every sensible ~an habitual l y 
a cts in all relations of life ." 2. Then it requires very little 
1. Drake,D. Problems of Rel.pp.l80-185. 
2 . Rashdal l,H. Phil. and Rel.~.l32. 
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logic to aee the place of faith in philosophy. 11 A man vd'lo al-
ways reasons and never trusts wi ll not reason creatively or fruit-
fully . I f reason is to interpret the real world, it must exercise 
a certain a~ount of trust in the unseen, - trust in the best 
hypothesis that has be en found t n explain the facts, and trust 
that the same rational order lJrevails in the en ti re cosmos as has 
been observed by scienti s t s and philosophers in our hwnan corner 
of the uni verse ''l. 
The use of faith in religion is self-evident, for re-
ligion itself is often defined in terms of faith as its one phase. 
Sometimes religion and faith are used synonymously . "Religious 
consciousness is man ' s faith i n a power beyond himself, whe r e by 
he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life, and 
which he expresses in acts of worship and serv i ce 11 2. It demands 
fait h besides the mere knowledge for us to take advantag e of the 
work ing s of the spiritual laws. ''We reco gnize the truth of tre 
laws of the spiritual life, but it requires faith to us e them. The 
difficulty in the way of it is not an intellectual but a moral, not 
an ob.jective but a subjective difficulty 11 3. To say that religion 
ex ists in the strngth of faith would not be of an extreme state-
ment. Fa ith is necessary to r eligion as reason is, only more so. 
The inherent harmony between r eason and faith is, I 
ho pe, implicitly pointed out already. Creighton contends that 
feeling is an integral part of reas on. And faith as a trustful and 
confidential mode of feeling is part of the material which reason 
1. Brightman,E.S. I nto. to Phil 
2. Galloway,G. The Ph i l. of Rel. 
Drak e,D . Problem of Rel . lJ.l86. 
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tries to sys tematize in a cohe r ent whole. The popul ar notion that 
the feeling and reason form and an thesis i s not val! d . Feeline; 
and tho ught interp~ene tra te ao much so that "a defect or i mperf ec-
tion in one s i de is a mark of fail ur e in the other : wrong f eeling 
connote s as well a lack of thinki ng , or a prejudi6e or bi as in 
i ntellec tual co~rrehens io n, while def iciency of feeling in concre te 
aff a i rs i s eenerally synonymous wi th logical incapac ity . .• Without 
f eel ing and intuition there coul d be no concrete unity of exper-
ience , just as there coul d be none without eff ort and the wo rk of 
t he sc i en tific "Lmders t andi ng" l . Hov.-ever, as i t v.as a11~ea.dy dis-
cussed i n the second se c t io n, there has been histo rically a con-
f lic t between reason and faith. But this con~lict has been due 
to a f a l se idea of one or the other, f or between f a ith as trust 
and reason as the po~er that carri es on the rrocess of anal ys i s, 
synt:nes i s a re not opp osed t o each other . "Faith presu1:;po s es reason 
and reason f a ith. . .J!'or the wholesome development of f a i th and 
reason i n a life, it is i mportant tha t ne ither attri bute should 
gai n exclus ive contro l of the mind . A man who al ways reasons and 
never trusts vdl l no t rea.son creatively and fr ui tfv~ly. A man 
~ho al ~ ays trust and nev er reasons ~i ll find his faith becominc 
more and more mechanica l. At times, man sho uld consciously cruti-
va te t he lif e of faith; at other ti mes, the :r-ati onal uncierst::mdi ne. 
of{experience . Sv.ch alternation (as Ho cking cal l s it) will yie l d 
a total lif e in which each don1atn i s in harmony v. i th the other 11 2 . 
III. THEIR IDEA~ RELATIOFS 
Any noun that i s qualifi ed by the adjective ideal is 
1. Cre i ghton, .J. E. "Reason and Feeling " Fhil .RevSep t.l92l:pp .465-481. 
2 . Bri ghtman ,E.S. I n tl!Yo to Phil . 
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not very easy either to understand or to define accurately . It 
i s so~ething not i n existence as its entire ~hole, and yet it has 
to be exy.:lained in terms of v.hat has been in order to be intelli-
gible. So we will proceed to consider .their mutual independence, 
their dependence, and the contl·i bution of philoBophy to religion 
and of rel igion to philoso phy. 
A. I n Eov.- Far Are They Mutually Independent? 
Philoso1Jh:y and rel i gion are independent in their dis-
t i nctive ends . Philosophy aims to e,ive a rational ez]Jlana.tion and 
interpretation of life ~s a whole. On the other hand reli g ion 
s eeks to establish and maintain ri ght ~elationship betwe en man and 
man, man and God. Understanding may be regarded as the keyword of 
IJhilosophy vrhi le cooperation is the..t. of · rel icion. Patrick v,ri tes, 
"I n lJhilosophy the purpose is the love of vdsdom and the resulting 
mental peace and satisfaction. In religion the purpose is peace, 
harmony, adjustment, salvation. Phil oso:r;hy and religion thus deal 
often with the same ideas, such as the soul, its origin and des-
tiny , God and creation; but the interests are different in the tvto 
fields. I n the former, they are theoretical and intellec tual; in 
the latter, emotional and personal - practical in a sense different 
from the practicality of applied s ci ence"l. "Both religion and 
philosophy ask the why and wherefore of thines. Eoth try to e;rasp 
the stun total of things and unde1·stand the good/of it all. Yet, 
the end in viev.· is different . 1lh.ile the salvc;.tion of the sotu is 
the end of religion, the discovery of truth is the object of phil-
osorhy 11 2. 
1. Patrick,J.T.W. I ntra. to Phil.p. 29. 
2 . Radhakrishnan ,S. The Reign of Rel . in Contemporary Phil.p. 5 . 
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But not only in their distinctive ends are they mutually inde-
pendent . They are also independent in their distinctive stress 
upon the use of di ff eren t methods in order to ac compli sh their 
ends . Eea.son is the hie;hwayof phi lo soylhy ; f aith is the pathway 
of reli gion . Phi l osor·hy answers the lJrobl em of the whole by logic, 
~bile relieion answers it by faith . I t is the mood of wonder and 
curiosity that starts one on the h i ghway of philosophy; i t is the 
mood of uncertc::dnty and despair that starts one on the pathway of 
re l igion . 11 So tnetimes we are in a :nood of wonder musing whether 
the who le worl d has any meaning , purpose, or val ue~ Then we turn 
to phil os ophy . Or, perhaps, we are i n a mood of doubt or· even 
of despai r, oprres sed by the weight of our pery;lexi ties and cares 
and then we turn to religion 11 1. So "whil e t he phil os orher reas ons 
and argues, the religious man believes and acts, lives and loves " 2 . 
I n as much as they are Independen t, nevertheless, their 
der..: enden ce t o ea ch other i s of great si(!;ni ficance . "Religion rests 
upon the rec·ogni ti on of a real m of hi gher values and a kind of 
i nstinc tive sympa thy with t hem and longing for them . Since the 
task of philosophy is to study the meanings and values of the worl d , 
we see how intimate is the relation between rhilosophy and reli gion • 
. . If we define religion as the cultivation of the spiritual values 
which are eve r present, but sometimes dormant, in the hu.rnan soul, 
it belongs to philoso phy to scruti nize these values, determi n i ng 
their so urce and their objective equivalents. If , again, religion 
is the re s1='o nse of the soul to the divine forces and v:hether any 
such exist "3 . So we now turn to the consideration of their mutual 
l. Patrick,J.T .W . I n tro. to Phil.p.26. 
2 . Radhakr i shnan ,S.The Reign of Rel . in Cont . Phil.p.5. 
3 . Patrick, J.T .~ . Intro. to Phil . pp .30~ 34 . 
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contribution to each other, ma.de it seems to me, rather incident-
~lly taan lJUrposi vely . Whether they shoul d be pnrposi ve or no t 
i s still an open question. 
B. What Shovld Philoso1Jhy Contribute :to Rel g ion? 
"I t is true tha t jajl i ttle l:lhil osophy incl i neth Man ' s ;nind 
to atheism; but depth in phi loso1Jhy br i ngeth man ' s minds about to 
rel~gion'1 1. This quotation from Bacon makes it a1Jparen t that phil-
osophy does s ome thing for religion. Ae;ain, Radhakri shna.n says, 
11 A religion which cuts its elf off from phi l os ophy cannot meet the 
deeper needs of our consciousness •... Truth is a harmony , and the r e 
can n ot be a gulf be tv1een r elig i on and philosophy 11 2 . The first 
and the most fundamenta l contribution that lJhilosophy mak es to 
reli gion is to furnish an i ntellectual foundation for rel i g ious 
beliefs . Mere subject i ve experiences of a r eligious lif e do not 
satisfy t he hwnan mi nd . Man se ek s for the objectivity and the 
rational ground of thos e experienc es that are so r·ersonal and pri-
vateand yet so real. "The only valid source of reli g ious t ruth, 
then, is philos ophy '13 . l'h i s may sound t oo ex treme and one-sided 
at the first glance, but there is much to s ay on the :roint. 11 Frmn 
t h e dawn of philosophy it has address ed itself to pr-oblems with 
which relir;ion ·was concerne d . Speaking generally, we may say that 
its endeavor was to put a rational theory in the place of mythica l 
explanations of the world , its ori gin, and its owrking; a vali d 
physi cal or metaphysical conception of r-eality and t he ground of 
being in place of naive ass umptions; a rational and moral idea of 
1. Essays OT Lord Bacon p . l6 . 
2 . Radhakrishnan,S . 11 Rel . & Phil. " Hib .Jour . 20( 1921-1922 )p . 41. 
3. 1-ilm,E. C. J be Probl em of Rel . p . 48. 
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God in _place of popular notions vvhi ch Vi ere neither; a rational 
ethics in pl ace of customary morality .. . I n all ages and climes , 
phi losophic concer tions have either gi ven a dist i nctive character 
to the religion of t hinking men, or have enabled them to satisfy 
thei r religious needs outside the t~adi ti onal religions of their 
surroundings 11 l. I f philosor·hy does not establish the real i ty of 
the object of the myst ic consciousness, theynystic experience loses 
its integrity and value. So for t he sake of religious interest 
~hiloso~hy ahould be allowed to test the value of the subjective 
assuranc es and so far as they are vali d fit them into its expla-
natory theory . Religion must allow phi loso1Jhy freely to examine 
and criticize the religion not l ess than any other kind of experience. 
I f any rel i gion shies away fr om the test of 1:hilosophy that reli gion 
is on its way of destruc tion. "A faith that forbi ds or fe ars 
analysis, and withdraws its elf from organic r ela tion to the res t 
of thought has tacitly asknowlede; ed its own irrationality and has 
thus surrendered its claim to truth. A f aith that has faith in 
its elf will not tremble on the brink of rational investigation"2 . 
Philos ophy s ho ul d a lso guard reli gi on from be i ng dog-
mat ic, static and narrow-minded by relating the religious experi-
ences to other experi ences, that come constantl y to the life of an 
individual as wel l afl that of a society. I t is very easy for insti-
tutiona li ze d reli gior rs to be doe;matic and pre judiei al in their 
point of view and im1ist t he ir own ways and forms. I t is largely 
due to their interes"~ in pres er ving the institutions; and their 
1. Moore, G.F. Th e Bj. rth and Growth of Rel. p .l 59 . 
2 . Brightman ,E. S. I n- ~or. t o Phil . 
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interest is often hirhly v1orthy of praise. Nevertheless, such 
conditions often leal e the unavoidable consequence, the cessation 
of ·e:rowth of the ins·d tution. Then, it becomes " the work of phil-
osophy to justify on r<itional g rounds the spiri t, though not the 
form, of accepted beliefs and traditional customs "l. I t is up to 
1:hiloso phy to step i1 ~ and point .o ut their weaknesses and help them 
to change t heir narrow and one-sided,institutional perspective to 
a cot..erent and cosmit l one • . Philosophy develops " a method of thought 
and knowledge which ·1'hile purifying tra.di tion should rreserve ·its 
moral a.nd s.ocial v all es unimpaired; nay, by purifying them, Rdd to 
the ir power and ~u tht~ri ty 11 2. 
C. Wl fat Should F.:eligion. Co!}tribl;lte : ~o Philosophy? 
DeYiey say:s, "Without Greek religion, Greek art, Greek 
I 
cj_vic life, their ph:Llo solJhy woul<i have been imrossible 11 3. Again, 
J astrow in talking a· ~out the a n cient people says, "I t was,no doubt, 
religion that eave t: fe stimulus to such/study, and in thisj8ense 
r eligion rneri ts to he called the mother of philosophy" 4. So here 
we have at least two l authorities on the idea that religion is a 
great contributory factor to philosophy . I t furnishes the ne cef' cary 
material, mw1el y , th b r eligious experiences, to complete the whole 
of life as considere ~ and interrret_ed by philo s ophy . No matter 
how profound a r~hilo sophic theory may be in other re s pects, j_f it 
neglects to take intb accCJunt the religi ous aspect of hUP.Jan nature, 
its validity will be questioned . "The whol e of experience, scien-
tific and relic;ious, is the problem of the philosopher . . . Relig ion 
l. Dewey, J . Reconstruction in Ph il.p.l9. 
2 • II ll ll l) • 1 7 • 
II p .l9. 
R 4. J astrow,M . The Study of el . p .229. 
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is a subje~ t to be 
4?. 
in~estigated by philo sophy as is any other 
side of experience. ~t i s more essentially the ~roblem of phil-
osophy as it assumes a system of values VJhich philosophy has 
also to consider . Reli g i ous facts have therefore more signifi -
cance for philosophy lthan any other . Reli gious faith reveals an 
asJ:-ect of hU:nan nature deeper than the intellect 11 l. So philosophy 
r,:art of v1hose v ork h i analysing the religious experi ences and 
I 
· clarify ine their c on:f lus ed me.ter i als deduces diverging conclusions 
which result in the J oncepts like God, Soul, and Destiny. By 
subtle analys is and <[lose def inition of the elements confused ~n 
its orieinal datura, :. t disc overs and not creates its conce1: tual 
tools. So it wo uld 1lot be very far fro m truth to s ay that l:Jh il ... 
osor.)hy inherits · the i' aterial from rel i g i on t o inake the. bricks 
with which to build .lts st::r·ucture. However , it should be remem-
bered that religious / exper i ences significant as they are, are n o t 
the only experiences that :r;hilosol:;hy deals with . 
I n the secondpl ace, r eli g ion should guard philosophy 
from bec o:ning mere abstrac tions, pure intellectuali sm of pure 
idealism . Philosophy wi th its traditi onal delight in contempla-
tive quietis;n and its undue s t ress on log ical reasoninc has shown 
a tendency to fall into the world of mere ideas and concepts , ae 
as to lo::3e its vital influence upon the empirical worl d . F ur-
thermore, such a state of philo sophy breathes an unwholesome a ir 
of the s upre,nacy of the i ntell ectual lif e over the manual. Pure 
intellectualism i s just as much of an insani ty as pure emoti onalism 
from the chherent point of view . So religion which is interested 
1 . Radhakrishnan , S. The Reign of Rel. in Cont . Phil.p .l9. 
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and concerned about the practical life of the people and of the 
society, should guard philosophy fro;n falling into such a state 
by declaring the rational interpretation of one ' s obligati on and 
duty to the actual s oci ety as wel l as to the dream-land. 
Closely connected with this danger i s another tendency 
of phil os orhy, namely, the tendency to throw overbol~d the tra-
dit:Lonal values of human experience. This tendency is strong es -. 
pec ially ·when philosophy has to react against relit:ion or any other 
institutions that ciogmatically insist the forms of their traditions. 
Robins on ' s Mind I n The Making seems to be an illustration of the 
point . But by virtue of the fact that traditional belief has a 
keen interest in preservi ng their essent i al values, although they 
do not a l ways use the proper methods, that the human s .Jciety has 
as much inheritanne as it does today . " The advantages of social 
esteeill and authority, and of intima te contact with what gives 
life its deeper lying values were on the side of traditional be-
l • ~ .~..1er. . . Abstract science cannot convey love and loyalty, nor can 
it be a subs titute , even Ul)On the more techlilical side, for those 
ways and means of fi ghting in which devotion to the country has 
been traditionally embodied. One doe s not just fight, one fi ghts 
for one ' s country 11 l . "Christianity has rendered i mportant s e r-
vices to l::hilosophy in the course of its history, :particularly 
by e.n:rhas izine; on the one hand the i mprotance of historical fact and 
concrete l:;rocess, and on the other by keepine; fast hol e of what 
is universal and abidin[ in the flux of thines. Again in its 
doctrine ofGod as Spirit at its highest manifestation, ' Christianity 
1. Dewey, J. Reconstruction in Phil.}:; p . l4-15. 
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[,ave the greatest assistance towards the development of the notion 
of Personality, a notion of the profoundest i tn}J[!l'rtance, for whic h 
ancient philos ophy had no name at all " l . A pers on v1ho is not a 
pers onalist may question the validity of the last part of t h is 
quotation . But whether the worth of t he stat~nent a s a phi loso-
phical theory is questione d or not, the truth of it can.lOt be de-
nie d , for the develop~ent of the idea of personality is g r eatl y 
influenced by Christianity . And that the Christi an i dea of per-
s onality has played a significant roll in the pro ,c;ress of human 
society a lso needs no defence. Philosophy in its : sea:rch for truth, 
11 nothing but the truth and no thing but the v1hol e truth , •• needs to 
cons ider and we igh the tradi ti ~' nal values conserved by reli gions . 
I V. THE E:I!,FECT OF SUCH RELATIONS 
We have previously said th_· t it is hard to define any 
term }J receded by the word, I deal. Now we are confronted by a 
sti ll ~ore difficult task, the consideration of the effects of 
the ideal rela tions bet ween philosophy and reli g ion if s uch shoul d 
exist. 
A. Upon Philo sophy . 
Any :phil8 s ophy that takes wha t religion has to offer 
a n d also gives wra t it can to r eligion will be at least more coherent 
than the sys t ems that are hostile to religion and would not take 
the relieious expe riences into their account. J ust a s a blue 
bulb will change the tone of li ght ol'ler a whole room, so the light 
shedding from the reli gious experience may give an enti rel y dif-
ferent coloring to a system of philo sophy . Because of _,the unde-
1. J .E .C . Jhil . Rev. 30 (1 921 ) p . 318 . 
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niable fact abou t religio us experi~nce , having such a coloring 
would be truer t han without. 11 If philoso}Jhy is true to itself , 
it must include al l of religion in its interpretation of experi-
ence as a whole. Reasonable philosophy does not lJretend to be 
omnisc ient, nor does it fall prey to the fallacy that it can prove 
everything , or can spin the universe out of its own inte r ior. 
Philo sophy is only the attempt of thoU;:;ht to do the best it can 
vli th the universal problem of experi ence 11 l . 
On the other hand religion that holds subh a relation-
ship with phil osophy will have an intellectual foundation so as to 
meet the needs of a whol e pers on, emotional, volitional and intel-
lectual. Relie:ion that keeps even pace with philo sophy wil l be a 
gr0wine: and illurninating help to a person and to a society in v:hich 
in exists . While thelessentials in religion need not to be changed 
the means and ways of interpreting and conserving them will have 
t:J be changed in order to rnee t the day and thereby preserve them . 
I n doing that the light that philosophy throws on the conceptual 
terms, like the ulti mate reality, theory of consciousness , cri-
terion of truth, and moral values , is of extreme value. "If re-
licion is true to itself, it must express its elf in affirmations 
that inevitably raise philosophical question~ 11 2. 
The life of a person or of a society guided and en-
· gendered by philo sophy and religion that hold such a relationship 
vrill be a life of a happy medium, established and balanced so as 
not to drift when the stor.Tis come and the winds bloY>'. So much of . 
the confusion and irrationality on the one hand and the mental 
l. Brightman,E . S . "Contribution of Phil. to Theory of Rel. Ed . 11 p .l4 . 
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indifference and coldness on the othe r 1nay be remedi ed to a great 
extent. I t wo uld b e a life t hat treasure a ll moral values and 
k n ov.-s the v.hy c.nd the how a t t he same time . I t would be a life 
tha t sees its duty an~obligation and has dri ve enough to perf orm 
them too . 
CONCLUS ION ~ SillJfMARY 
After a brief and cri tical review of some of the his-
torical definitio ns of r eligion, we have concluded that the defi ni-
tion of reli gion needs to i nclude the mys tic fe el ing, the ethical 
i mplications , the rational f ac tor, the voluntari stic , the social 
and pra ctic~l , and the nonnat ive elements . As a n at t emp t to in-
elude al l these elements we defined r elig ion as the f eeli ng and 
understand ing of one ' s personal r elation with God, whi ch manifes ts 
itsel f inv.ardly i n the cmmnunion with God and in t he i mplicit f a i tn 
in the ultima t e conquest of the good a nd outwar dly in the acts of 
~orahip and in carrying out the uns we rvi ng will to strive fo r 
such a conquest as the destiny of ~ankind . 
We have a lso a ttempted t o define philosophy to serve 
our prelimi nary purpose of the paper. Philosophy , as s study , i s 
the at t em11t to understand and organ i ze the whole of life in har-
many vlith the univers e as it conceives, a nd as a spirit, it is a 
ti reless, endless and unprejudiced, o ~en-minded effort to dis cover 
and uphold the truth. 
We have also cons idered the historical relations of 
philoso phy and reli gion in the ir conf lict, neutrality, and harmony. 
The conflict has not been in the essential s of r eli eion~and phil -
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osophy, but rather in the mistaken notions or so:ne non-essentials 
of one or the other. Their neutral relations did not have any 
f ar reachine; influences. I t was rather a reactionary movement 
agai nst the undes irabl e conflict existing between the two. Their 
harrnony as cons istency and as identity was held by the profound 
thinkers, such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher and Lotze. 
The fact that ther e has been such a variety of relationship be-
tvieen the two seems to indicate at leas t that they are related i n 
some ~ay or other. 
I t has been als o noted that they both deal with the 
problems of the Ultimate Reality, of the conservat ion of values, 
and of the interpretation of life as their subject-matter . Even 
in their methods they do not conflict each other. Reas on~ phil-
osorhy ' s chief a'llienue , is not only fr·iendly wi th faith, religion ' s 
hie;hv:a~ , but is i nc ompl ete vii thout it and vice vers a . 
I n the consideration of thei r ideal relati ons ~e have 
noted that they are mutually independent . They both have di f-
f erent ends to attain through the different phases of hULIJ.an fa-
cu.lty . Philoe.ophy seeks to give, through the hu"Tlan intellect, 
2. rational eX}Jlanat io n and interrretation of life as a who l e, 
v:hile rel i g ion seeks t o establiBh and nJa i ntain , through the human 
capacity for f aith, rieht relationship between man and man , amn 
and God . Nevertheless , there is mutual dependence . Religion 
needs the con tri buti on of phil osorhy in v e"l ida tine; and e;i vine ex-
. · t 1 terms to the reli uious exrJeriences . Ard presslon 1n concep ua_ u • · 
fh ilosophy needs the contribution of religion in comrleting and 
vitalizing its fi eld. 
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So the effect of such relations between the two upon 
1.ohilosophy , upon religion, and upon life in g eneral would be 
v;holeso:ne and hel1")fu.l. Philosophy would be inclusive and more 
coherent than before with its dangers of becoming mere abstractions . 
Viell guarded . Religion wo v~cl be an intell igent ~. and grovdng one 
with its danger of being doeillatic or static ~ell guarded . And 
the life as a whole would be a life of a halJPY :nedi um wel l bal-
anced and es t aolish ed . Behind the cloud of chaos in modern thought, 
we see the glimpse s of hope novv and then of realizine: such an 
ideal relationship between lJhilosophy and relig ion in its full 
measure . 1ay the day come soon! 
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